The Commonwealth lies at the northeastern end of the Appalachian coal fields, which have produced about 90% of the coal historically mined in the United States (Figure 7). Bituminous ("soft") coal underlies more than 13,000 square miles in the western and central sections of the state.

Currently, Pennsylvania accounts for 7.11% of US coal production by all methods combined, ranking fourth (behind Wyoming, West Virginia, and Kentucky) in statewide production. Within Pennsylvania, Greene County had the highest total production in 1998 with more than 38 mst of bituminous coal (nearly all by underground methods), followed by Washington County with 10.2 mst. Greene and Washington Counties together accounted for more than 78% of all coal produced by underground methods in 1998 in Pennsylvania. Other top coal-producing counties in 1998 included Armstrong County (6.7 mst), Somerset County (6.1 mst), Indiana County (5.5 mst), and Clearfield County (4.5 mst). In all, 21 counties in Pennsylvania produced bituminous coal in 1998 (PCA 1999).

The high-volatile Pittsburgh seam (Figure 8), historically the most important bituminous coal bed nationwide, covers more than 8,000 square miles in Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, and Maryland. The Pittsburgh seam averages more than 5 feet in thickness and currently accounts for more than 60 percent of the total bituminous coal production in Pennsylvania (PCA 1999). At present only the Pittsburgh seam is being mined using longwall technology, and the active mines are in Washington and Greene Counties.

Pittsburgh seam bituminous coal is especially valuable for metallurgical uses. However, the steel making industry has declined in importance nationwide, so most Pittsburgh seam coal today is used for electric power generation. Relatively high in the sulfur that causes air pollution, Pennsylvania coal must compete with lower sulfur coal imported from western States as well as from foreign sources in a marketplace that seeks out the lowest priced commodity. Its high energy content allows Pittsburgh-seam coal to be blended with coals lower in sulfur but less energy-rich.

Electric utilities are the largest consumers of coal in the United States, accounting for 90% of total coal use nationwide (Figure 32). Pennsylvania utilities, which likewise account for 90% of the coal consumed in the Common- wealth, used coal to generate 59% of their electric power output in 1998 (PCA 1999).

Most of the privately-owned coal resources in Pennsylvania are owned by parties different from the land surface owners. Mineral owners have the right to extract their coal, subject to certain restrictions and environmental regulations.

The two most common techniques currently used for the underground mining of coal are traditional room-and-pillar and longwall. Both of these techniques could be used at the same time in different parts of a single mine, but typically are not, except to the extent that mine entries in longwall mines resemble traditional room-and-pillar areas.

The most highly productive underground mining method today is longwall mining, which allows the rapid and complete extraction of coal from a seam. Longwall panels can be 1,000 feet wide and 2 miles long (Figure 9). Longwall mining is most effective where the coal seam is of uniform thickness (as the Pittsburgh seam tends to be) and where the seam has been unaffected by any previous mine activity. A dozen or more coal seams may overlie the Pittsburgh seam at any given location (Figure 8). Because of the subsidence typically associated with longwall mining operations, the subsequent recovery of coal from overlying seams is effectively precluded.
 

Coal production played an important role in the history and economy of Pennsylvania. In the 1700s, Pennsylvania coal fueled the Industrial Revolution in the United States. It supported the Colonial iron industry, Andrew Carnegie's steel mills in the late 1800s, and the electric power plants of modern times. Some 10 billion tons of bituminous coal have been mined in Pennsylvania over the past 200 years, nearly one-fourth of all the coal ever mined in the United States. Bituminous coal mining in Pennsylvania reached its peak in 1918, when 181,000 underground miners produced 177.2 million short tons (mst).

Total PA coal production generally decreased during the last 20 years, while underground production nearly doubled, largely due to an increased use of the high-extraction longwall method.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, during the early years of the implementation of SMCRA, the proportions of coal produced by underground and by surface mining methods were about equal. In 1976, total bituminous coal production in Pennsylvania was 85.75 mst, consisting of 44.33 mst from underground mines and 41.42 mst from surface mines. Total coal production trended generally downward during the next 18 years (Figure 10), until the mid-1990s when it began to increase once again, only to decline once more in 1999.

The general decline in total coal production for several decades was largely a result of decreases in surface coal production. By 1998, more than three times as much bituminous coal was produced in Pennsylvania by underground as by surface mining methods. The 1998 underground production of 61.285 mst was higher by 52% than the production only ten years earlier, whereas the 1998 surface production of 18.260 mst was lower by 33% than the 1988 production (PCA 1999).

Not only has the underground share of total coal production increased dramatically during the past several decades, but it has also become significantly more efficient in terms of its human labor requirements. Statistics compiled by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and reported by the National Mining Association (NMA 1999) reflect these efficiencies. In 1983, there were 3,337 coal mines nationwide, with 175,642 miners producing 782.1 mst. Fifteen years later in 1998, there were 1,750 mines (a decrease of 48%), with 81,000 miners (a decrease of 54%), yet total coal production exceeded 1,118 mst (an increase of 43%).

The trends in Pennsylvania are even more dramatic. Total underground bituminous coal production in the Commonwealth increased by 64% between 1983 and 1998, while the number of coal miners underground decreased by 81%.

Advances in coal-production technologies historically have contributed to increased productivity per unit of human labor. In the earliest underground mines, coal was produced by hand. Coal-cutting machines first became available in the late 1880s, and mechanical coal-loading equipment was introduced in the early 1920s (EIA 1995a).

The recent trends of increasing production and decreasing employment in underground coal mines to a large extent reflect an increased use of the high-extraction longwall mining method. The longwall method of mining was introduced in southwestern Pennsylvania relatively recently, about 25 years ago. During the early years of its use, it was treated as an experimental method, and the operations employing it were relatively small by today's standards (Figure 11).

Longwall mining started to become a major influence on the landscape of southwestern Pennsylvania only during the mid to late 1980s. Total longwall production nationwide increased 79% between 1993 and 1997 (National Coal Leader, Nov. 1998). Today longwall mining accounts for about 75% of the bituminous coal produced from Pennsylvania's underground mines (PADEP 1999b).

For example, Consol Energy, the fourth largest coal producer in the United States and currently the largest producer of coal from underground mines, traces its roots to 1864. (This company is now owned by RWE AG, a $71-billion conglomerate based in Germany.) In 1972, Consol started its first US longwall operation in West Virginia. By 1998, its 16 longwall mines accounted for 77% of Consol's total underground coal production. Of the top three underground coal mines in the United States in terms of 1998 production, two were longwall mines in southwestern Pennsylvania owned by Consol (Enlow Fork Mine, ranked #1 with 8.8 mst; Bailey Mine, ranked #3 with 8.3 mst; National Mining Association 1999). Consol currently controls five of the eight active longwall mines in Pennsylvania.
 

Consol Energy reduced the number of its operating mines from 55 in 1972 to 25 in 1998 (a 55% decline), while increasing total annual coal production by 27%. Between 1978 and 1998, Consol reduced its number of employees approximately 60%, from over 21,000 to fewer than 8,600 (McDonald and Brune 1999). As a result of its use of improved technologies, Consol increased productivity from 39.5 short tons per worker per day during the first quarter of 1999 to 46.3 tons during the first quarter of 2000 (Coal Outlook, 1 May 2000, p. 2). Efficient technology has led to significant layoffs of miners.

Production efficiencies related to longwall mining have led to significant reductions in the number of underground miners.

Throughout the United States there were 73 active longwall operations in 1993 (EIA 1995b). Ten of these were in Pennsylvania, all in either Greene or Washington Counties (Figure 12).

Eight of the ten longwall mine operations active at the end of the 1990s are currently active (Table 1). Three corporate entities control these eight longwall mines: the German conglomerates RWE which owns Consol (5 mines) and RAG which owns Cyprus Amax (2 mines), plus Ohio-based Maple Creek (1 mine). None of these entities is controlled by a Pennsylvania corporation. Yet these longwall mine operators get preferential treatment from PADEP when they are allowed to destroy wetlands with impunity, unlike hundreds of other permittees Statewide.

Individual longwall mines are major operations, affecting tens of thousands of acres over a period of several decades. The use of longwall mining in Pennsylvania received an enormous boost in 1994 when the state mining laws were amended by Act 54 to allow subsidence (with "restoration") where previously subsidence was forbidden. Longwall mining clearly is the technology of choice for the foreseeable future in southwestern Pennsylvania, and hundreds of thousands of additional acres are at stake.

In Pennsylvania in 1998, the 7,985 remaining miners produced 79.54 mst of bituminous coal (PCA 1999). In terms of numbers of mines, underground mines represented only 10% of all coal mining operations (53 underground vs. 472 surface operations in 1998), yet the output from underground mines accounted for 77% of Pennsylvania's total coal production (PCA 1999). The "Act 54 Report" prepared recently by the PADEP reported that the 10 underground mines using longwall methods at that time (the other 74 mines in the survey used traditional room-and-pillar methods) mined 63% of the total acreage from 1993 through 1998 (PADEP 1999b).

While coal production historically played an important role in the economy of Pennsylvania, more than 200 years of coal mining here also have left a legacy of environmental devastation. According to PADEP information (PADEP 1996, 1998b; Rossman et al. 1997), the legacy of coal mining in Pennsylvania includes the following facts:

• Pennsylvania has one-third of all abandoned mine-related environmental problems in the United States.
  
• More than 2,500 miles of Pennsylvania streams currently are degraded by acid mine drainage (AMD) pollution.
  
• 52% of all miles of waterways listed as "impaired" on Pennsylvania's 1998 Section 303(d) inventory list were degraded by AMD -- more than all other categories combined.
  
• Pennsylvania has 250,000 acres of unreclaimed coal mine land (abandoned mine land, AML).
  
• Some 2.6 billion cubic yards of coal refuse cover Pennsylvania's landscapes, material generally unsuitable for plant regrowth and potentially a source of AMD.
  
• The environmental problems caused by past coal mining affect 45 of Pennsylvania's 67 counties.

Appropriations for abandoned mine reclamation from Pennsylvania's "Operation Scarlift", which provided on average $8 million annually for 25 years, ended in 1995. The Commonwealth's future receipt of money from the Federal Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, historically the principal source of expenditures for AMD and AML cleanup efforts, is in "jeopardy" due to the fact that the trust fund is scheduled to stop collecting revenues from active coal operators in 2004 (PADEP 1998b).

Under the current "Growing Greener" initiative, whereby PADEP is authorized to allocate nearly $240 million over 5 years in funding for environmental projects statewide, $3.5 million has been earmarked for fiscal year 1999-2000 for contracts for abandoned mine reclamation and AMD abatement projects. This pittance will help supplement, at least for the short term, the uncertain future public funding for abandoned mine cleanup.
 

Even at the rate at which authorized funds for publicly sponsored reclamation have been spent in the recent past, it will require more than 400 years just to clean up the known contamination from existing abandoned mines. Clearly it would be fiscally prudent, if nothing else, to prevent more such debacles in the future rather than try to clean them up afterwards. Modern technology and compliance with environmental requirements can reduce substantially the adverse impacts of new mining operations, but only if that technology is utilized and the environmental requirements are enforced.

At the current rate at which public funds for reclamation are being spent, it will require more than 400 years to clean up the known contamination from existing abandoned mines.

As illustrated by the popularity of longwall mining, the coal-owning conglomerates have been eager to adopt labor-saving innovations that increase the recovery of coal, despite their high demands for capital investment. New technology that would protect the environment also costs money, whereas exporting environmental damage to surface owners, to the taxpaying public, and to the environment is much cheaper for the industry absent stringent enforcement of existing law. Coal is abundant on the national and world markets, and profit margins can be slim. Coal operators are understandably reluctant to spend money on environmentally protective technology or methods if they are not required to do so by agencies responsible for enforcing the laws of the Commonwealth.

If the technology exists and the regulatory structure is in place to prevent environmental destruction from coal mining, one might well wonder why such damage still occurs. The principal reason appears to be that PADEP (and the Federal agencies), which should be enforcing the environmental protections of existing laws and regulations and encouraging the use of protective technology in every new mine they approve, fail to do so---despite regulations that look reassuring on paper and notwithstanding the claims of their public spokespersons.

Because of the historic record and the extraordinary potential for environmental damage, the public might expect that applications for coal mining activities receive a more rigorous and comprehensive review to identify potential environmental impacts than applications for other types of development, such as housing subdivisions. One might expect that a State agency whose very name involves the words environmental protection would be using every regulatory tool at its disposal to prevent further degradation of the Pennsylvania environment by coal mining. Yet this is not the case. Instead, the review of the permit process described in this report documents how the PADEP and its BMR downplay the adverse environmental impacts of mining while seeking to accommodate the mining industry by issuing mine permits expeditiously and by paying little or no attention to their own environmental regulations or to public or review agency comments.

Longwall Mining Effects on Surface Water Resources

(G. & C. Merriam Co. 1974)

The word "undermine" has become a common part of our everyday language. Its use always has negative connotations, and for good reason.

By its very nature, underground coal mining entails a risk of surface subsidence as gravity induces the downward movement of the overlying rock strata to fill the void left where coal has been removed. Traditional room-and-pillar mining methods were designed to leave behind sufficient coal to support the mine roof, thereby preventing its collapse and surface caving. Properly designed room-and-pillar mines were not supposed to collapse; when they did, it was accidental. Surface subsidence is an unusual, unplanned failure of room-and-pillar mine design and technology. PADEP sells insurance to surface owners against such damage at premiums subsidized by taxpayers.

In some cases, secondary "robbing" of support columns without proper authorization would result in surface subsidence with unpredictable damage to human safety and property as well as to the natural environment. Pillar removal, known as "retreat mining," also leads to collapse of the mine roof.

Longwall mining, by contrast, induces deliberate, uneven subsidence of the land surface relatively quickly after mining. Longwall mining aims to remove virtually all of the coal in rectangular panels from beneath extensive areas. The consequent mine roof collapse is a normal, or "planned", part of the longwall operation. The entries, where some support coal is left, subside less than the panels where all coal is removed (Figure 13).

The United States Office of Surface Mining describes longwall mining and the surface effects of subsidence as follows:

 
The extraction of material from underground mines without leaving adequate support for the overlying soil and rock layers (the overburden) results in their collapse above the mine into the void and may result in the subsidence of surface lands over the mined-out area. The downward movement can be accompanied by horizontal movement, strain, tilt, and even by locally upward movements of the land surface. Most surface subsidence in the United States has been attributed to the underground mining of coal....[T]roughs (depressions in the ground surface formed by the sagging of the overburden into the mined-out area) are commonly related to subsidence of a longwall mine. ... The surface area affected by subsidence can be larger than the mined-out areas as a result of angle of draw. ... Ninety percent of the surface subsidence caused by longwall mining occurs within 4 to 6 weeks of mining. ... Subsidence can lead to functional impairment of surface lands, features, or facilities. (USOSMRE 1999)

The PADEP also recognizes the effects of longwall mining on surface water resources. In the introductory passage to its Technical Guidance Document entitled Perennial Stream Protection (PADEP 1997c), it states:

As documented by case histories and technical literature, underground mining operations have induced stream flow losses. ...in some cases they have adversely impacted stream uses.

There is no question that longwall mining causes adverse surface effects due to subsidence. Indeed, the certainty of prompt subsidence is promoted as one of the "advantages" of longwall methods over more traditional underground mining methods, in that the adverse effects can be observed shortly after mining and can be "repaired" by the mine operator. Just because subsidence from longwall mining is certain and to some extent predictable, however, does not make it benign, particularly if all of the adverse effects are not anticipated, acknowledged, or reported and if the effects that are acknowledged are not adequately remedied by the mine operator (Figure 14).

The meager existing literature on longwall mining of coal shows physical, chemical, and biological changes in streams as a direct consequence of mining (Tibbott 1998, CECI 1999). Replacement of riffles by pools due to subsidence can reduce aquatic habitat scores by 50% and decrease the number of species present (Kepler 1999). Subsidence and fracturing can induce the acidic water associated with overlying coal seams to enter wells and streams. Similarly, adverse changes can and do occur in wetlands. The impacts on streams as a result of longwall mine subsidence have only recently begun to receive serious attention through formal studies. Similar impacts on wetlands have not yet received the same level of attention.

Like structures (Figures 15 and 16), wetlands can be damaged by longwall coal mining activities in a variety of ways. There can be direct impacts when wetlands are filled or regraded in connection with the construction of mine entries, preparation plants, haul roads, refuse disposal areas, boreholes, airshafts, or other mine-related activities that take place on the surface. Hydrologic impacts on wetlands can occur when surface water is lost as a result of direct drainage into underground mine voids or as a result of diversion into the cracks and fissures created by subsidence. Wetlands can be converted into ponds when excess water is trapped in subsided depressions (Figure 17). Acidic discharges also can have deleterious effects on wetlands.

Most wetlands and streams affected by longwall mining have not been previously influenced by coal mining activities, and thus they display the natural biological communities typical of freshwater resources in southwestern Pennsylvania (for example, see AEC 1991). The effects of "planned" subsidence can be just as devastating to these resources as more obvious regrading or fill activities. When the hydrology crucial to a wetland's existence is removed or excessively augmented, the wetland first loses its ability to function effectively and ultimately ceases to exist altogether.
 

Although subsidence from longwall mining is intentional and certain, its precise extent and impacts are less predictable. Nevertheless, prediction of wetland loss and formation apparently has never been attempted by mine operators or required by BMR.

Wetlands can be damaged by longwall coal mining by fill or regrading for surface construction, by ponding, or by loss of water through cracks and fissures created by subsidence.

The surface damage from subsidence that occurs to houses, barns, highways, streets, railways, springs, wells, pipelines, streams, wetlands, farm fields, forests, and other surface features often is not evident to the casual observer. The undulating surface imposed by subsidence cuts across the more imposing topography of hills, valleys, and streams on the surface landscape. Typically, the most obvious sign that an area has experienced subsidence is the appearance of "water buffaloes" (drinking water replacement tanks) in homeowners' yards (Figure 14). Scaffolding and bracing around homes and businesses may help to reduce structural damage during the most active period of subsidence (Figure 15). In general, the thicker the coal seam that is removed and the closer it lies to the surface, the greater the resulting surface subsidence.

On 27 April 1966, the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (BMSLCA) was enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature. The BMSLCA was adopted because damage from uncontrolled mine subsidence was acknowledged to be seriously impeding land development, eroding the tax base, and causing a clear and present danger to the public health, safety, and welfare (PADEP 1999b). The BMSLCA was amended in 1980 and again in 1994, the latter amendment commonly known as "Act 54".

One of the original elements of the BMSLCA was "[t]he prevention of damage from mine subsidence" (emphasis added). The Act 54 amendments shifted that policy in a most significant way to "[t]he prevention or restoration of damage from mine subsidence" (emphasis added). Previously subsidence damage to many resources was to be avoided, but since Act 54 it has been allowed in Pennsylvania. Few of the resources previously protected under the policy of "prevention" now are included under the policy of "restoration". Wetlands and other natural resources typically have no standing or representation at all in the Act 54 "restoration" process. The unfortunate reality for many surface owners who now are victimized by "planned" subsidence is that any restoration or other compensation they ultimately receive may only be partial and may come years after the damage is experienced.

Where subsidence damage can be predicted, human occupants and property owners can be forewarned to anticipate the mining-induced earthquakes. Residents often must move out of their dwellings during the period of most active surface movement while cracks appear and poisonous gases are most prevalent (Figure 16). Wetlands, streams, and other natural resources cannot simply get out of the way.

One method to prevent or minimize subsidence, whose use is required in certain limited situations, is to leave areas unmined so as to provide the necessary surface support. Mine operators are reluctant to do this because (a) it requires that more of the natural resource be left in the ground, and (b) it interrupts the efficient flow of the longwall operation and thereby adds to its costs.
 

A second method to prevent or minimize subsidence is to backfill, or backstow, waste material into the mine void during the brief interval after coal removal but prior to advance of the hydraulic jacks allowing roof collapse. Backstowing technology has been used successfully for many decades in underground coal mines in Europe that must minimize surface damage in populated areas. To the extent that the underground void is filled with waste coal, overburden, and other solid materials, the opportunity for surface subsidence necessarily is reduced (Bise et al. 1993, NAE 1975). The reduction in subsidence can be highly significant in lessening surface damages both to wetlands and to structures.

Despite a requirement to consider backstowing, and to provide a rationale if opting not to use it, mine operators have been encouraged to ignore this procedure that could significantly reduce subsidence impacts.

A secondary benefit of backstowing is that it reduces coal refuse piles on the surface. Such piles otherwise are a necessary and highly damaging consequence of underground mining, destroying streams, wetlands, and valleys on the land surface (Figures 17 and 22).

Coal wastes generated by a Pennsylvania longwall mine typically make up about one third of the total material extracted from the mine. The volume of such waste from current operations alone, if backstowed, is not sufficient to fill the void left by the removal of salable coal. Hence there is ample room to accommodate old piles of coal wastes in new longwall mines (Figure 17). There currently is no economic or regulatory incentive for mine operators to dispose of coal wastes (new or old) underground, however, despite the empty rhetoric of Pennsylvania regulations. So there is no backstowing.

PADEP regulations ostensibly require that backstowing be used. In the Chapter 90 regulations relating to coal refuse disposal, the primary demonstration required to obtain a permit is as follows:


The person who conducts coal refuse disposal activities shall maximize, to the extent technologically and economically feasible and consistent with applicable deep mine safety requirements, the underground disposal of refuse in abandoned, inactive or active deep mines, or in abandoned or unreclaimed surface mines. The application shall include a statement specifying whether or not disposal of coal refuse in abandoned, inactive or active deep mines or in abandoned or unreclaimed surface mines is proposed for the operation and, if not, outlining the technical, economic and safety considerations prohibiting such disposal. [§90.3. General requirements: permit]

Despite this apparent requirement at least to consider backstowing, and to provide a rationale if opting not to use it, mine operators have been encouraged virtually to ignore it.

Coal industry representatives argue that alternatives to prevent subsidence are impractical and too costly to implement. For example, in the Vesta Mining Company application (Permit #63951601) for a new 227-acre coal waste disposal pile, the only discussion of backstowing was as follows:


[Backstowing] is seldom used. This method involves mixing the fine refuse with water to produce a slurry then injecting this slurry into worked out portions of the underground mine. Unfortunately, this method is very costly, won't work in longwall mines (because the roof is collapsed eliminating the mine voids) and doesn't include the coarse refuse. (Killam 1994a)

The disposal of coarse refuse underground was not discussed at all by the mining consultant, particularly not as a means of lessening subsidence. Instead, the BMR approved a non-slurry spoil disposal pile 250 feet deep that would bury 2 miles of permanent stream with a diverse fauna, plus more than 3 acres of acknowledged wetlands along the stream corridor. Available, inactive room-and-pillar mines of the Vesta complex as well as the proposed new Hillsboro longwall mine were conveniently nearby for backstowing but were not even considered by applicant or regulators. The Chapter 90 refuse disposal regulations focus on the surface disposal of coal wastes, not their return underground, despite the decorative fig leaf of §90.3.

If a strong regulatory stance were to be taken by the PADEP, requiring nothing more than strict enforcement of its existing regulations, it might create the necessary incentive to mine operators to explore the feasibility of various alternatives to prevent or minimize subsidence effects. With a balance of "carrot" and "stick" approaches, the PADEP could create an environment whereby mine operators would refine innovative new technologies to address the subsidence problem.
 

Unfortunately, mine operators in Pennsylvania currently lack any incentives to minimize subsidence impacts on wetlands and other surface resources. The only adjustments required by PADEP are those by surface landowners and the public at large, who must continue to deal with the damage and distress that "planned" subsidence imposes upon them by mine operators authorized by the State to extract privately-owned coal. The traveling public must absorb the cost of delay during highway and public road closures and repairs, while taxpayers must defray the costs of road repair. In contrast, wetland losses are seldom noticed.

To date there has been no inventory of wetlands in areas above longwall mines prior to mining nor any followup inventory of wetland losses and gains in those areas post-mining. Wetlands created by subsidence are not "planned" in terms of size, location, or type.

The BMR repeatedly has ignored its own regulations and failed to require permit applicants to consider existing technology to minimize subsidence and to mitigate unavoidable effects properly. The unfortunate and unnecessary wetland impacts that result are documented in this report. The disastrous effects of subsidence are not limited, of course, to wetlands.

Wetland Creation By Subsidence

Wetland destruction by subsidence from longwall mining currently is inevitable, because wetlands are completely ignored by mine engineers and regulators alike. Mine-induced subsidence can accidentally create new wetlands by producing new surface depressions or by turning existing wetlands into ponds.
 

Although wetlands can be and have been created as a result of longwall mining activities, there currently is no basis for assessing any changes in wetlands as a result of longwall mining across the landscape of southwestern Pennsylvania. There is good reason, however, to anticipate significant net losses from mine subsidence.

Wetlands inadvertently created by subsidence are not "planned" in terms of size, location, or type, and thus cannot be credited as "replacement" for wetlands impacted.

If a trough is created at the ground surface above the center of a longwall panel, it can cause surface water to drain and collect there. Depending on site-specific soil and other physical characteristics, water may periodically or permanently become ponded and allow wetland soil and plants to develop. If a wetland already exists, however, too much water can turn the wetland into an open water pond (Figure 18).

There is no reason to expect that wetlands dried up or drowned in one place are replaced by new wetlands created elsewhere in the same watershed. To date there has been no inventory of existing wetlands in the areas above the longwall mines prior to mining nor any followup inventory of wetland losses and gains in those areas post-mining. The wetlands created by subsidence are created inadvertently. They are not "planned" in terms of size, location, or type.

The wetlands created by subsidence typically occur on land not owned by the mine operator. These new wetlands may be viewed as a nuisance by the surface landowner. If a wetland is created in an inconvenient location, such as in a lawn or farm field, the landowner understandably may request the mine operator to eliminate (drain) it promptly. No permits to drain such wetlands are required by PADEP. Drain pipes outletting at streams can be observed on farmlands in areas subsided by longwall mine panels (Figure 19).

Wetland Creation for Impact Mitigation

In a typical Chapter 105 individual permit, wetlands impacted by a proposed project must be replaced by the creation or restoration of new wetlands as mitigation. BMR, however, does not require mine applicants to address the issue of wetlands lost to subsidence, regulations notwithstanding. Even for wetland impacts associated with the surface activities of underground mining operations, no examples of actual wetland replacement could be found.

The PADER (1992) prepared a guide for the intentional creation of replacement wetlands by permittees. Such creation of wetlands to mitigate unavoidable losses authorized by PADEP permit generally has been expensive and plagued by lack of success (McCoy 1992, Kline 1991, Jackson 1990). No similar review is available for mitigation projects initiated since PADER guidance became available.

Eight Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) wetland mitigation projects constructed during the 1980s across the State produced 10.7 acres of replacement wetlands at an average cost of just under $150,000 per acre. Only 25% of these replacement areas were deemed fully effective as functioning wetlands when inspected by the US Fish and Wildlife Service (McCoy 1992).
 

In Washington County, the new wetlands created for impacts associated with the Monongahela Valley Expressway cost $282,367 per acre, and the 2.7 acres achieved an "effectiveness score" of only 50%. Such experience is the basis for resource agency demands that wetlands permitted to be filled be replaced at acreage multiples greater than 1:1. In short, intentional wetland replacement is not cheap, and it may not be effective. Plans must be designed by competent professionals, carefully implemented by knowledgeable supervisors in appropriate sites, and monitored following construction, if functioning wetlands are actually to be created (other than by accident) in the coalfields or anywhere else.

Specific wetland protection provisions of the Chapter 105 regulations have been incorporated directly into PADEP coal mining regulations.

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